Project Freedom Is Trump’s War-Powers Trap in Hormuz

The most dangerous wars often arrive dressed as logistics.

On Sunday, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would begin “Project Freedom” on Monday, May 4, to guide stranded commercial ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman that connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. The humanitarian case is real: the Associated Press reports that hundreds of vessels and roughly 20,000 seafarers may be affected, with ships stuck since the Iran war began and crews running short of water, food, and other supplies. But the machinery being attached to that humanitarian claim is not small. U.S. Central Command says the mission will use guided-missile destroyers, more than 100 land- and sea-based aircraft, unmanned platforms, and 15,000 service members to restore commercial navigation through the strait. CENTCOM’s commander also described the mission as occurring while the United States “maintain[s] the naval blockade” of Iran. That is the sentence I cannot get past. A rescue lane inside a blockade is not traffic control. It is a combat architecture waiting for a trigger. Associated Press¹, U.S. Central Command²

I think Congress should require explicit authorization, or at minimum binding statutory limits, before this escort mission becomes operational as a combat mission. Not because Hormuz is unimportant. Because it is so important that the political pressure to escalate will become almost impossible to resist once U.S. warships are physically interposed between Iranian forces and global commerce.

Start with the stakes. Hormuz is not a symbolic waterway. The International Energy Agency’s February 2026 factsheet says nearly 20 million barrels per day of oil moved through the strait in 2025, including about 15 million barrels per day of crude and nearly 5 million barrels per day of oil products. The same factsheet says alternative crude export capacity through Saudi and Emirati routes is only about 3.5 million to 5.5 million barrels per day, and that about 93 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports and 96 percent of the UAE’s LNG exports transit the strait, representing almost 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade. So when Hormuz closes or even looks unsafe, the shock does not stay in the Gulf. It moves through fuel prices, shipping insurance, fertilizer costs, Asian energy security, and eventually household budgets. International Energy Agency³

That fact creates the strongest argument for Project Freedom. International law gives ships and aircraft a right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea says that right “shall not be impeded.” Iran’s attempt to turn the passage of neutral shipping into a toll booth or coercive bargaining chip is not a norm the United States should bless. If the world accepts that a coastal state can choke a critical strait whenever it wants leverage in a ceasefire, every other chokepoint starts to look more fragile. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part III⁴

But lawful passage is not the same thing as domestic authorization for combat. This is the key distinction. The right of a ship to move through Hormuz does not automatically answer who, under the U.S. Constitution, may order American forces into foreseeable hostilities to make that passage happen. The War Powers Resolution was written for this gray zone: not formal declarations of war, but situations where presidents introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. The Congressional Research Service explains that the statute’s purpose is to ensure the “collective judgment” of Congress and the president, that Section 2(c) frames presidential power to introduce forces into hostilities as limited to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States or its forces, and that the 48-hour report and 60-day clock do not themselves confer authority to wage war. Congressional Research Service⁵

Project Freedom sits squarely in the danger zone that language was meant to cover. AP reports that two ships around the strait reported attacks hours before Trump’s announcement, that Iran quickly denounced the escort plan as a ceasefire violation, and that Trump warned any interference with the process would be “dealt with forcefully.” Iran’s deputy parliament speaker also said Tehran would not return the strait to its prewar conditions. Those facts do not describe a routine maritime assistance mission. They describe a preannounced confrontation in which both sides have publicly attached military meaning to the next move. Associated Press¹

The usual reply is that presidents must be able to protect U.S. forces, citizens, allied vessels, and commerce without waiting for Congress to move at congressional speed. I agree, up to a point. If an American ship is under attack, the president can and should defend it. If neutral crews face immediate danger, the United States can help evacuate them. If mines must be cleared to prevent imminent loss of life, commanders cannot pause for a floor debate.

But that is not the same as deliberately building a sustained escort regime with destroyers, aircraft, drones, and 15,000 personnel, then treating the first foreseeable drone, mine, missile, or warning shot as the legal springboard for a wider campaign. The administration is not stumbling into risk. It is choosing a formation in which the risk is obvious in advance.

History is useful here because it strips away the fantasy that good intentions solve escalation. During Operation Earnest Will in 1987 and 1988, the United States escorted reflagged Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq War. The National Defense University’s review of declassified records shows that Reagan administration officials often sought restraint and proportionality. President Ronald Reagan wanted to act only in self-defense, officials debated limited targets, and policymakers were wary of striking mainland Iran. Yet the mission still produced the ladder we should fear now. After the tanker Bridgeton struck a mine in July 1987, U.S. officials considered retaliation but held back. After a missile hit the Sea Isle City in October 1987, U.S. forces attacked Iranian offshore oil platforms in Operation Nimble Archer. After the USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a mine in April 1988, the administration debated broader retaliation, and Operation Praying Mantis followed. National Defense University Press⁶

That history does not prove every escort is illegal. It proves something more practical and more damning: escalation can be the product of a well-managed defensive mission. The trap is mechanical. First, commercial ships become a test of American credibility. Second, American escorts become targets or tripwires. Third, any incident creates pressure to punish Iran so the escort mission does not look hollow. Fourth, retaliation creates new Iranian incentives to answer. Nobody has to want a war for the system to start producing one.

The legal aftermath of the Tanker War is also a warning. In the Oil Platforms case, the International Court of Justice held in 2003 that U.S. attacks on Iranian oil platforms in 1987 and 1988 could not be justified as measures necessary to protect U.S. essential security interests under the treaty framework before the court, although it did not award Iran the remedy it sought. That judgment does not settle the U.S. constitutional question, and it does not mean a warship can never defend itself. It does show how quickly “protecting commerce” can turn into contested armed force, especially when the target shifts from stopping an immediate threat to imposing costs after the fact. International Court of Justice⁷

The administration’s framing makes that shift more likely, not less. If this were only about extracting stranded crews, the mission would be defined around evacuation corridors, deconfliction channels, neutral monitoring, and a short sunset. Instead, CENTCOM’s public description ties Project Freedom to freedom of navigation, a major military package, international coordination, and an ongoing naval blockade. That combination blurs three missions that should be kept separate: (1) humanitarian relief for stranded seafarers, (2) commercial escort through a dangerous strait, and (3) coercive pressure on Iran through blockade and sanctions. When those missions merge, any attack on one becomes a rationale to expand the others. U.S. Central Command²

Congress does not need to choose between paralysis and a blank check. It can authorize a narrow mission with hard edges: a fixed duration, a defined geographic corridor, mandatory public reporting of hostile incidents when classification allows, force limited to immediate defense of U.S. forces and escorted vessels, no strikes on Iranian territory or non-imminent retaliatory targets without further authorization, and automatic funding cutoff if the mission expands beyond escort or evacuation. That would not solve every operational problem, but it would force the basic democratic question before the shooting starts: are American forces defending passage, or are they entering a naval war to compel Iran?

I expect the administration will resist that distinction because ambiguity is useful. Ambiguity lets the White House call the mission humanitarian when seeking support, defensive when invoking commander-in-chief powers, and strategically coercive when signaling to Tehran. But Congress should not let the same operation wear three legal costumes.

My threshold is simple. If Project Freedom produces even one U.S. strike on Iranian assets not directly engaged in an imminent attack, and Congress has not authorized that use of force, the mission will have crossed from escort into undeclared war. The indicators to watch this week are the first War Powers notification, the published or leaked rules of engagement, and whether congressional leaders demand a vote before the 60-day clock becomes a political alibi. If those limits do not appear fast, Hormuz will stop being a chokepoint for oil and become a chokepoint for constitutional war powers.